Project Syndicate - Historical turning points are normally easier to identify in retrospect. But it will not require years to determine whether North Korea�s test of a nuclear explosive device qualifies as one. It does. The question is whether it proves to be a turn for the better or for the worse.
Some argue that little has changed as a result of the test. The world assumed for years that North Korea possesses enough nuclear material to make a half-dozen or more basic nuclear bombs. The test made explicit what was implicit.
But what was assumed is now known. So much has changed. North Korea has challenged the world; the question is how the world responds.
The stakes could hardly be higher. North Korea�s leaders have a history of aggressiveness, a demonstrated contempt for their people, and a record of selling just about anything (from drugs and counterfeit dollars to missile parts) to earn hard currency. The danger is that they might be tempted to use a nuclear weapon, act irresponsibly in the belief that such weapons shield them, or sell one to terrorists.
A second danger concerns the regional consequences of North Korea�s test. Northeast Asia is a dynamic arena, home to many of the world�s powers, including China, Russia, Japan, the two Koreas, and in many ways the United States. This dynamism could lead to instability, owing to multiple sources of mistrust and the lack of strong regional institutions to help manage rivalries.
Global consequences exist as well. North Korea is now the ninth state with nuclear weapons, joining the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Israel, India, and Pakistan. The danger is that we may fast be approaching a tipping point. How the world responds to North Korea is likely to affect the calculations of other would-be nuclear powers, including Iran. Maintaining peace in a world in which literally dozens of fingers are on nuclear triggers will be far more difficult�and the consequences of failure far more destructive.
Initial reactions to North Korea�s nuclear test were uniformly critical, culminating (thus far) in UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which condemns the test, demands that North Korea resume full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and imposes a range of military, political, and economic sanctions.
Nevertheless, North Korea�s leaders are clearly betting that they can get away with what they have done, and that the world will get used to their nuclear weapons program, much as it did with Israel, India, and Pakistan.
They may be right. Both South Korea and China are reluctant to support robust sanctions. South Korea�s �Sunshine Policy� is best understood as �unconditional engagement.� Not surprisingly, this �all carrot, no stick� approach has failed to affect North Korean behavior.
China, for its part, has made clear that it does not intend to inspect cargo moving in and out of North Korea across their long common border to ensure it does not contain items prohibited by Resolution 1718. While China opposes North Korea�s pursuit of nuclear weapons, it is even more opposed to policies that could threaten the North�s stability and lead to massive refugee crossings into China or to a unified Korea with its capital in Seoul.
So the challenge remains to devise a response that will gain widespread international backing and influence North Korean behavior and capabilities. One option is a �preventive� military strike. The problem is that it would almost surely trigger a massive, costly war, and it would not necessarily succeed in destroying all of North Korea�s hidden capabilities. Moreover, both China and South Korea strongly oppose such a scenario, while the United States is poorly positioned to implement it, given its involvement in Iraq.
A second option is living with a nuclear North Korea. The danger is less that North Korea might use nuclear weapons (although it might) than that it might sell them. President Bush�s warning that �the transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable of the consequences of such action,� is meant to deter this outcome. The problem, of course, is that deterrence sometimes fails.
The third option is diplomacy. North Korea would be expected to give up its nuclear weapons and place its nuclear material under international safeguards in exchange for formal security assurances, energy resources, and a range of political and economic benefits. Such efforts should be renewed as soon as possible; the US should agree to bilateral as well as six-party talks with the North, possibly in exchange for a moratorium on nuclear tests.
It will take a blend of the three options � the threat of military force, the reality of economic sanctions, and the resumption of diplomacy �to deal with North Korea�s challenge. This will not be easy, but it is worth pursuing, because the alternative�a desperate, hostile, nuclear-armed, and isolated North Korea�should alarm everyone.

Richard N. Haass is President of the Council on Foreign Relations and author of The Opportunity: America�s Moment to Alter History�s Course.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2006.
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